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Mexico experienced widespread economic reform in the last two decades. From being
a protectionist economy with a policy of import substitution, it has turned into an
export-oriented open economy. Why was protectionism a stable policy, and how was it
overturned by a reform that went against entrenched interests? I apply a game theoretic
model of political inﬂuence and economic reform to answer these questions using data
to calculate the payoﬀs for the relevant interest groups. In the underlying cooperative
game, the core is empty and a protectionist coalition of import-substituting ﬁrms and
the government was “stable” until the eighties. Adjusting the model’s parameters to
changes in the government’s ﬁnancing options in the late eighties and early nineties
leads to a diﬀerent and unique outcome. In the predicted outcome a free trade policy
is adopted through cooperation between all players.
En la ´ ultimas dos d´ ecadas M´ exico transit´ o de una econom´ ıa proteccionista a una
economa abierta y orientada a la exportaci´ on. ¿Por qu´ e fue el proteccionismo una
pol´ ıtica estable, y c´ omo fue sustituido por una reforma que actu´ o contra intereses
creados? Para contestar estas preguntas, utilizo un modelo de teor´ ıa de juegos en que
la inﬂuencia de los grupos de inter´ es inﬂuye en las decisiones de pol´ ıtica. Al ajustar los
par´ ametros del modelo a los datos, el juego cooperativo subyacente, tiene un n´ ucleo
vac´ ıo y predice que una coalici´ on de empresas que sustituyen importaciones y el go-
bierno es “estable” hasta los a˜ nos ochenta. Para tomar en cuenta los cambios en las
opciones del ﬁnanciamiento del gobierno a ﬁnales de los ochenta y principios de los
noventa, se ajustan los par´ ametros del modelo. De ah´ ı surge un nuevo equilibrio ´ unico
que predice la adopci´ on de una pol´ ıtica de libre comercio.
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11 Introduction
There is nothing more diﬃcult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct,
or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction
of a new order to things.
Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince
Why did Mexico keep a protectionist policy for almost four decades? Why did it
change to free trade? After the Mexican Revolution and particularly after the Sec-
ond World War, the Mexican government followed a policy of import substitution
industrialization. The government supported the “National Industry” through tariﬀs
and subsidies. In the late eighties, the government made a complete change in trade
policy. In the span of eight years, from 1986 to 1994, the Mexican government lowered
import tariﬀs, entered the GATT and successfully negotiated a free trade agreement
with Canada and the United States.
I provide an answer to both questions by applying a cooperative game theoretic
model and examining its equilibrium outcomes by matching the model’s parameters
to the data from the relevant periods. The main points of my argument are as follows
1. Initially the government and the small and middle sized ﬁrms form a coalition in
which the government commits to keeping high tariﬀs in exchange for transfers
from the import substituting sector. The cooperative game induced by the data
has an empty core and therefore admits an ineﬃcient equilibrium outcome.
22. After the oil and debt crisis of the early eighties, the government’s main outside
source of ﬁnancing -oil revenues- is restricted. In response, the government
implements an overhaul of the income tax and VAT policy as well as stricter
enforcement.
3. Matching the model’s parameters to the exogenous change in the government’s
revenue from taxes leads to a new game with a non-empty core. The resulting
equilibrium outcome of the game have the government and the export oriented
ﬁrms cooperating and supporting a policy of free trade.
The ﬁndings suggest that the failed trade reforms of 1971-1975 and 1977-1980
could be the result of the underlying cooperative game having an empty core.
The change in policy predicted by the model does not depend on any assumptions
of positive transaction costs or commitment problems.
2 Protectionism and Free Trade in Mexico
In this section, I describe the historical and institutional details that are necessary
background for the development of the model of trade legislation in Mexico over the
last 30 years.
32.1 Tax and Trade Reform
The theory set forth links tax and trade reform to explain the trade policy change
that took place in the period of 1986-1994. I treat the tax reform that took place
in the years of 1988-1989 as the exogenous variable, while the trade policy choice as
determined in the equilibria of the model. Both reforms took place after a severe
economic crisis in 1982. The following describes both reforms and their context.
For seventy years, from 1929 to 2000, Mexico had a single party rule. In the year
2000, the presidency fell to an opposition party for the ﬁrst time. The Partido Re-
volucionario Institucional or PRI held, until the 1990’s, all governorships, a majority
in both chambers of Congress and the presidency.
The “oﬃcial party” appeared at the closing of the Mexican Revolution with the
intent of consolidating the remaining factions in a single political entity. Unique in
Latin America, the PRI maintained relative peace during seven decades. The party’s
three sectors are: agriculture, labor and the “popular sector” (the urban middle
class). For political and ideological reasons, the private sector was not in the party.3
Nonetheless, the government fostered the creation of business organizations, which
would provide a uniﬁed representation, and which were in fact the only political
channels businesses had available.4
At the end of the Second World War, the Mexican government adopted a policy
of import substitution industrialization (ISI). Several reasons existed for that choice.
3Schneider 2002, 79-80.
4Ibid., 81.
4First, there was the ideological orientation of the government looking to create a “Na-
tional Industry.” During the war, many small and middle-sized producers substituted
imports that were no longer available and even exported to the U.S. At the end of
the war the organizations representing them asked for trade barriers to be set up to
protect them from foreign competition.
The ISI policy, coupled with an orthodox handling of ﬁscal and monetary policy
appeared to have been successful until the end of the 1960’s, what is now called the
“Stabilizing Development” phase.
During the 1970’s, the government pursued aggressive ﬁscal and monetary policies
and had an increasing participation in the economy. The government aimed to modify
income distribution and alleviate historical injustices. The end of the decade saw the
discovery of large oil reserves. With the increase in oil prices, the country was able to
borrow signiﬁcant amounts: from 1971 to 1982, the public sector’s foreign debt grew
at an annual rate of 26.3%. In 1982 the government deﬁcit reached 17.6% of that
years GDP.5 It is widely believed that mismanaged policy and the fall in oil prices
led to the debt crisis of 1982.
After the crisis, the government could not borrow from the foreign credit markets.
The government of president De La Madrid attempted to balance the budget as part
of a macroeconomic stabilization program but failed.
To ﬁnance expenditures the government needed other sources of revenue. When
the Salinas administration took over in 1988, an objective for ﬁscal policy was to
5Sol´ ıs Manjarrez 2000, 378-379.
5increase overall tax revenue by 1% of GDP.6 The ﬁscal authorities took several mea-
sures for that eﬀect: changes in the taxable base to adjust for inﬂation, much stricter
enforcement of tax laws and the introduction of a minimum corporate tax. The
minimum corporate tax took the form of a tax of 2% of the value of ﬁrm’s assets
(adjusted for inﬂation). The ﬁrms that reported proﬁts could credit the asset tax
payments for their income tax obligations. The number of ﬁrms paying taxes in-
creased from 1,929,124 in 1989 to 5,602,486 in 1993.7 Administrative changes also
simpliﬁed tax collection. The government sold virtually all government owned ﬁrms,
including the banks nationalized in 1982. All the above allowed the government to
lower marginal tax rates to international levels.8 The corporate tax income revenue
increased from 2.38% of GDP in 1989 to 2.78% in 1993. A complete description of
the tax reforms is in Gil D´ ıaz and Thirsk, 1990.
The stabilization plan included curbing inﬂationary inertia. The government,
leading ﬁrms and unions agreed to increase their prices by no more than a certain
amount for a predeﬁned period of time. The “pacts,” as they came to be called, were
renovated periodically.9
To take advantage of the “law of one price” as an aid in curbing inﬂation the
government lowered tariﬀs on certain imports. In 1986, Mexico entered the Gen-
6Gil D´ ıaz and Thirsk 1999, 30.
7Ibid., 81-83.
8Urz´ ua 2000, 79.
9Sol´ ıs Manjarrez 2000, 395.
6eral Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT).10 It is important to notice that even
then, this mild form of trade liberalization was neither an end in itself nor a binding
commitment. Mexico had unilaterally decided to lower tariﬀs.
Trade reform eventually became an end in itself as part of the government’s pack-
age of structural reforms. From an inward looking economy, the government promoted
an outward looking economy based on exports. In 1993, the government signed the
North American Free Trade Agreement with Canada and the U.S. The agreement
went into eﬀect January 1st, 1994. The Secretary of Trade during the Salinas admin-
istration, Jaime Serra, responding to criticism of the government’s lack of industrial
policy, said “NAFTA is our industrial policy.”11
2.2 Business Organization in Mexico
The second component in the story is the set of interest groups that promoted or
blocked the trade reforms. The two subsets of the private sector relevant for this
exercise are the “Import Substituters” and the “Export Oriented Firms.” A brief
description of Mexican business organization clariﬁes which ﬁrms they contain.
There are two types of business groups in Mexico: the compulsory and the volun-
tary. Although recent changes in legislation removed compulsory participation, it was
a signiﬁcant diﬀerence during the period of study. Table 3.1 summarizes the business
organizations discussed below.
10Ibid., 198, 200.
11Johnson Ceva 1998, 137.
7TABLE 3.1
Business Organizations in Mexico
Sector Founded Members Trade Orientation
Compulsory
CANACINTRA Industry 1941 Small & medium size ﬁrms Protectionist
CONCANACO Commerce 1918 Regional chambers Toward protectionism
CONCAMIN All Industry 1918 Regional chambers Toward protectionism
Voluntary
COPARMEX Employers 1929 All types of entrepreneurs Free trade
CMHN Industry 1964 Big Corporations Free trade
CCE All Business 1975 Business Groups Toward free trade
Source: Flores Quiroga (1998), Schneider (2002) and Thacker (1999, 2000).
The government fostered the ﬁrst group, business organizations with compulsory
participation, by legally forcing ﬁrms to join an industrial or commerce chamber. The
government founded the Confederation of Industrial Chambers (CONCAMIN) 12 and
the Confederation of National Chambers of Commerce (CONCANACO)13 in 1918,
to represent the interests of industry, retailers and other service providers.
Several dozen chambers representing particular industries like foodstuﬀs, tobacco,
textiles, chemicals and capital goods compose the CONCAMIN. The relative presence
of speciﬁc industries changes its position in matters of trade policy, which has not
been consistent across time.14
12Confederaci´ on Nacional de C´ amaras Industriales.
13Confederaci´ on Nacional de C´ amaras de Comercio.
14Flores Quiroga 1998, 87-89.
8Due to the Second World War, imports from the U.S. were unavailable. This gave
the opportunity for Mexican producers to substitute for them and even export them to
the United States. In 1941, many of the small producers that had appeared just before
and during the war were joined by the government in the National Chamber of the
Transformation Industry (CANACINTRA).15 At the end of the war, CANACINTRA
demanded a high level of protection from the government and continued incentives
for the development of the national industry.
CANACINTRA’s lobbying was successful with the abolishment, in 1951, of the
U.S.-Mexico free trade agreement of 1943 and the passing of a law that forced the gov-
ernment to buy Mexican goods whenever possible (even if imports were cheaper!).16
To counterbalance the government’s policies, activist ﬁrms joined in voluntary
organizations. The ﬁrst such group was the Employer’s Confederation of Mexico.
(COPARMEX), founded in 1928 by a group of Monterrey’s ﬁrms disgruntled by
labor laws.17 The second and arguably most important one is the Council of Mexican
Businessmen (CMHN),18 founded in 1962. The CMHN is a “not secret, but discreet”
association of 30 to 40 of the CEO’s and owners of the biggest corporations in Mexico,
(they comprise the majority of the ﬁrms now publicly traded).19 The CMHN has the
privilege of an annual closed door meeting with the president as well as hosting a
15C´ amara Nacional de la Industria de la Transformaci´ on.
16Ibid., 90-91.
17Confederaci´ on Patronal de la Rep´ ublica Mexicana; Ibid., 97.
18Consejo Mexicano de Hombres de Negocios.
19The CMHN “no es secreto, pero s´ ı discreto.” Quote in Schneider 2002, 90.
9monthly luncheon/discussion with a cabinet member involved in economic policy.20
The CMHN proposed and sponsored the formation of the Entrepreneur Coordi-
nation Council (CCE) in 1975.21 The CCE, an umbrella association representing
all business councils, formed a uniﬁed front against president Echeverr´ ıa’s perceived
“leftist” policies.
Figure 3.1 shows the structure of the CCE. Each member holds one vote, giving
the export oriented ﬁrms and their related ﬁnancial interests the majority. CANAC-
INTRA does not hold a vote but is a permanent guest of the CCE.
FIGURE 3.1
Members of the CCE
CCE














The CCE hired an advising committee that would accompany government oﬃcials
20Ibid. 83, 89-90.
21Consejo Coordinador Empresarial. Flores Quiroga 1998, 98-99 and Schneider 2002, 94-100.
10during the NAFTA negotiations, mostly ﬁnanced by the CMHN. Some of the other
groups complained of the committee’s bias towards the interests of the larger ﬁrms
with international interests.22
The free trade interests of the CCE have 4 out of 7 votes but represent only
4% of the indirect members of the CCE. The CONCAMIN and the CONCANACO
represent 13.8% and 55.2% respectively.23
The protectionist ﬁrms represented by CANACINTRA and CONCAMIN will be
the import substituting “player” in the theory. Similarly, the CMHN represents the
free trade oriented player.
2.3 Coalition Building in Mexico
Other authors, like Flores Quiroga and Thacker, have previously studied the political
inﬂuence of the private sector, as an explanation of trade in Mexico.
In a regression exercise, Flores Quiroga ﬁnds that the size and trade orientation of
ﬁrms are statistically signiﬁcant for the level of protection in the economy. His work
stresses that trade policy needs to gather political support from interest groups.24
He also mentions two instances of failed trade reform, one in 1971-1975, and
another in 1977-1980. He argues both failed because of the pressure of protectionist
business groups.25
22Thacker 2000, 161.
23Flores Quiroga 1998, 101.
24Ibid., 119.
25Ibid., 194-196 and 255-257.
11Two works by Thacker (1999, 2000) describe the importance of political coalitions
to support policies in Mexico. He argues that government sponsorship for trade
reform is not enough; trade reform needs the support of a political coalition. In
his argument, the government and protectionist ﬁrms formed a coalition to promote
import substitution policies. However, during the 70’s and 80’s the power structure
between the three players (Exporters, Import Substituters and Government) shifted
due to a series of external eﬀects beyond their control (international ﬁnancial changes,
oil shocks, etc.). The changes in power structure disrupted the existing coalition and
led to the formation of the free trade coalition, which supported the changes in trade
policy in the late 80’s and 90’s. One of the key points in Thacker’s argument is that
policy makers form coalitions with private groups whose leverage is the greatest.26
I will argue such an assumption is not necessary; an implicit cooperative game, and
whether it has an empty or non-empty core, determines the outcomes. Exogenous
changes in the 1980’s changed the underlying game to one with a non-empty core
therefore leading to a trade policy that was more eﬃcient in the aggregate.
The results also suggest that the failure of the proposed free trade reforms of 1971-
1975 and 1977-1980 could be attributed to the emptiness of the core of an associated
cooperative game.
26Ibid., 37.
123 Modelling Policy and Coalition Formation
A general version of the model is developed in detail elsewhere.27 Here, I present
a three-player version along with the relevant calculations, from the data, of the
exogenous variables in the model. The relevant economic agents in this setup are a
set of interest groups. Each agent is an interest group with access to resources it can
use to inﬂuence policy or institutional reform. Interest groups choose from a set of
policies and receive payoﬀs based on their policy choices. The choice itself is made
trough voting, similar to the standard cooperative games of voting.28
The set of players is N = {X,M,G} where X is represents the export oriented
ﬁrms, M the import substituting ﬁrms and G the government.
Let the policy choices be {P,FT}, P is the protectionist policy and FT is the free
trade one. Three types of variables are relevant to the players: the number of votes
that players have for policymaking, the endowment of resources they can bargain
with and the ﬁnal payoﬀs they will receive. The voting rights and endowments are
given exogenously but the ﬁnal payoﬀs are determined in equilibrium.
A voting rights proﬁle is a function ω : 2N → R+ with ω(∅) = 0, ω(N) > 0 and
such that
ω(S) + ω(T) ≤ ω(S ∪ T) for all S,T ⊆ N; S ∩ T = ∅.
A coalition can choose policy if it is winning. For µ ∈ (1
2,1], a coalition S with
27See S´ anchez-Mier, 2005.
28For an introduction to cooperative games and their applications see Shubik, 1984.
13ω(S) ≥ µ   ω(N) is called a µ-winning coalition.
An endowment is a vector ψ( ) ∈ Rn
+ that assigns “disposable income” to each
player for each policy choice. Each endowment proﬁle is the result of the underlying





The bargaining position of each coalition is the minimum payoﬀ it can guarantee
for itself even if the rest of the players vote against it. In general cooperative game
theory this payoﬀs are represented by functions v : 2N → Rn that vanish on the
empty set. The number v(S) is called the worth of coalition S; N is called the grand
coalition. I refer to an arbitrary cooperative game as v, while the cooperative game
resulting from the environment of interest groups and policy choices as g. Formally
the game g is deﬁned as
g(S) =

   














ψi(FT)} if ω(S) < µ   ω(N)
∀S  = ∅ and g(∅) = 0.
This way of deﬁning the game is standard in game theory though not the only
alternative. For this particular application the worths of each coalition given by g
should be thought of as “reservation prices”. In particular they are not outcome
allocations. It is convenient to think of them as what each coalition brings to the
table, a starting point for negotiation. The point in deﬁning the game is to ﬁnd which
29As the data shows, this is not an unrealistic assumption as far as the three players are concerned.
14coalitions are likely to form and what side payments players make. An outcome for
this game is a vector of payoﬀs and a partition of the set of players containing a
winning coalition. The winning coalition pins down the policy choice.
The set of players in the game is: N = {Export Oriented Firms, Import Sub-
stituting Firms, Government}. The ﬁrst group represents the larger (mostly public)
corporations represented by organizations like the CMHN and the CCE. The second
group would be the small to middle sized ﬁrms represented by the CANACINTRA
and the CONCAMIN.
The exogenous variables to calculate are: the voting rights proﬁle (the leverage
of each player relative to the others) and two sets of endowments, the ones resulting
from continuing the status quo policies of a closed protectionist economy and the ones
under free trade. This is necessary since two games will be obtained, corresponding
to the economy before and after the tax reform.
TABLE 3.2
Endowments
Before Tax Reform After Tax Reform
Export Oriented ψX(P),ψX(FT) ψ′
X(P),ψ′
X(FT)






The government’s endowments are calculated before and after the tax policy that
increased the taxable base by including the asset tax.
153.1 Voting Rights Proﬁle
FIGURE 3.2























Source: Base de Datos Pol´ ıticos de las Am´ ericas, (1999).
The voting rights proﬁle stands for the number of votes or resources that the
players have to inﬂuence policy outcomes. At the time the trade and tax reforms
took place the PRI still had control of both chambers in congress as well as the
presidency. If all the PRI oﬃcials followed the party line, they had the opportunity
to have any policy passed without signiﬁcant congressional opposition. There are
many examples of party discipline in the PRI during the period of study not least
of which is the number of laws and constitutional reforms the government of Carlos
16Salinas was able to pass. Even after the 1995 crisis the government of Ernesto Zedillo
was able to push through a hike on the VAT rate by means of the PRI majority in
Congress. The signing of the NAFTA itself is an often quoted example of the “PRI
Bulldozer”.30
As ﬁgure 3.2 shows, even though the political control of the PRI was in decline it
still held a majority until the 1997 midterm elections. The Base de Datos Pol´ ıticos
de las Am´ ericas reports that the PRI held 81% of the available public oﬃces in
1988. This includes municipal heads, state representatives, governors, seats in both
chambers of congress and the presidency. The ﬁgure had decreased to 64% by 1994.
The voting rights for the government are assumed to be ω(G) = ω(N), that is
100% of the total voting rights. The other players have ω(X) = ω(M) = 0. The
majority parameter is µ = 51%. The government had control of the policy choice.
The “power” of the private sector relies not on the ability to dictate policy but rather
on the resources they have which can be used to inﬂuence policy.
3.2 Endowments
Excluding oil, the manufacturing sector is the most signiﬁcant contributor to exports
and imports. As reported by the National Institute of Statistics (INEGI),31 the manu-
facturing exports averaged 90.2% of non-oil exports in 1980-2002. The manufacturing
30La aplanadora pri´ ısta.
31Instituto Nacional de Estad´ ıstica, Geograf´ ıa e Inform´ atica.





























Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show the yearly participation of manufactures in both exports
and imports.
The calculated values of ψ(X) and ψ(M) are based on the data for the manu-
facturing sector. I assume the business leaders maximize the common accounting
proﬁts or net income (or the present value of them). In this model business leaders
have rational expectations, they fully anticipate the beneﬁts and costs associated with
diﬀerent trade policies.































The income statements of the public ﬁrms in manufacturing reveal an average net
income margin33 of approximately 8%. This estimate is based on the reported net
income margins of 33 ﬁrms traded in the Mexican stock exchange for the years of
1992-2001.
INEGI reports value of sales data for the manufacturing sector only from 1987 to
1995. Using this ﬁgures and the average net income margin of 8% gives an average
of net income to output of 4%. Using output data from INEGI, Figure 3.5 shows the
estimated net income of the manufacturing sector in the period 1991-2002.
33The ratio of net income to total sales.
19FIGURE 3.5
Estimated Net Income



























Source: Constructed by the author with data from INEGI, Worldscope.
The endowments identiﬁed to the net income of the manufacturing sector given
that its change is attributed for the most part to the surge in exports. The values of
ψX(P) and ψX(FT) are therefore set equal to the averages of the net income for the
periods of 1991-1993 and 1994-2002 at 1996 dollars.
As reported by INEGI, the proportion of imports to total manufacturing supply
has gone from roughly 10% in 1980 to 35% in 2002. 34 Assuming the 35% share
of manufactured goods were substituted under protectionist policies gives a rough
estimate of what domestic ﬁrms could have sold had they remained protected. Again,
34Total manufacturing supply is output-exports+imports.
20a net income margin of 8% of sales is used to estimate the net income of the protected
ﬁrms for the 1980-2002 period. Using output data from INEGI, the values of ψM(P)
and ψM(FT), in 1996 dollars, are the averages of the estimated net income for the
periods 1980-1993 and 1994-2002 respectively.
The calculation of the government endowment is based on the idea that in the
bargaining situation, the players consider the government’s corporate income revenue
associated with the manufacturing sector. It is the baseline revenue the government
gets from the private sector regardless of any other agreements. The Mexican gov-
ernment reports an aggregate ﬁgure for the personal and corporate income tax so
following Trigueros and Fern´ andez I assume a corporate tax revenue share of 3/5 of
total income tax revenue.35
Figures of the corporate income tax revenue paid by the manufacturing ﬁrms are
not available. An estimate is obtained assuming the corporate income tax is uniform
across all sectors in the economy, and using the ratio of revenue to GDP calculated by
Urz´ ua.36 I use 2.38% as proxy for the before reform tax rate and 2.78% as the after
reform tax rate. With the series for manufacturing GDP it is possible to construct
two series for the “before” and “after.”
Then, ψG(P) and ψG(FT) are equal to the average revenue of manufacturing cor-
porate income tax for the period 1980-1988 and 1994-2002 assuming the 2.38% average
tax rate. That is the revenue the government would obtain from the manufacturing
35Trigueros and Fern´ andez 2001, 108.
36Urz´ ua 2000, 81-83.
21sector without the tax reform. The values of ψ′
G(P) and ψ′
G(FT) are calculated sim-
ilarly but using the 2.78% rate. This represents the government revenue with the tax
reform.
TABLE 3.3
Calculated Entitlements and Endowments
ω(X) = ω(M) = 0 ω(G) = 1
ψX(P) = 12.22,ψX(FT) = 15.16 ψM(P) = 4.58,ψM(FT) = 1.16
ψG(P) = 4.82,ψG(FT) = 7.84 ψ′
G(P) = 5.63,ψ′
G(FT) = 9.16
Billions of Dollars of 1996
Note that I have not changed the endowments for ﬁrms before or after the tax
reform. I take the position that the changes in revenue were due mostly to the increase
in the taxable base and greater eﬃciency in collection. Sobarzo, in an applied general
equilibrium model, found that in simulations, changes in tax polices didn’t have strong
eﬀects in the allocation of resources while they did increase tax compliance.37
3.3 Before Tax Reform
So what does the model predict, given the calculated endowments? The parameters
induce two cooperative games, g and g′, representing two instances of bargaining over
trade policy. The game g stand for the negotiation before the tax reform, g′ is the
game after the reform. The induced game g is displayed in Table 3.4.
37Sobarzo 2000, 59.
22TABLE 3.4
Game Before Tax Reform
g(X) = 12.22 g(X,M) = 16.32
g(M) = 1.16 g(X,G) = 23.00
g(G) = 7.84 g(M,G) = 9.40 g(X,M,G) = 24.16
Billions of Dollars of 1996
The numbers g( ), are the payoﬀs that each coalition can guarantee for themselves
even if all other players act against them. For example, the coalition of the protec-
tionists and the government (M,G) can obtain $9.40 billion if the government chooses
P and $9 billion if it chooses FT. If the coalition were to form, it would choose P.
What policy will be chosen? Will all players cooperate? First note that g has an
empty core. There is no division of the $24.16 billion that cannot be improved upon
by a smaller coalition. Consider any payoﬀ vector x ∈ R3
+ that is eﬃcient,
 
i∈N xi =
g(N) = 24.16. For example, the one giving all the players their free trade endowments:
x = (15.16,1.16,7.84). Then player M can make an oﬀer to the government to form
a coalition with G, leaving X out, and having payoﬀs x′ = (12.22,1555− ε,7.84+ ε)
for some small ε. Player X can then propose a counteroﬀer: form a coalition with
G to support free trade and get payoﬀs x′′ = (15.16 − 2ε,1.16,7.84 + 2ε). To that
M can propose a counteroﬀer and so on. Does the process goes on forever? No, the
alternative is to use another solution.
23Here the solution is the Aspiration Bargaining Set. Why use this solution con-
cept? A common objection to the cooperative approach is that by deﬁnition the
solution concepts are eﬃcient (all gains from trade are realized) and impose a coali-
tion structure at the outset. The Aspiration Bargaining Set has none of these features.
The equilibrium coalition structure is determined through the play of the game, by
the solution concept itself. For this very reason, even in superadditive games the
resulting coalition structure need not lead to an eﬃcient outcome. The aspirations
solution concepts have other desirable properties but these are the more relevant to
the question at hand.38
To deﬁne the ABS, the concept of a Generating Collection is introduced. If the
players were to demand a certain payoﬀ in exchange for being part of a coalition,
which coalitions could aﬀord them? Formally, pick x ∈ Rn, then its Generating
Collection is a set




Let GCi(x) = {S ∈ GC(x)|i ∈ S}. Player i is vulnerable to j at x if
GCi(x)   GCj(x).
If a player is vulnerable, it means that it always needs to be in a coalition with
another player to obtain its demanded payoﬀ, but the other player does not. She has
an outside option. To avoid situations like this the solution concept will choose payoﬀ
demands that leave no player vulnerable.
38For more on the aspiration solutions see Bennett, 1984 an 1985.
24The Aspiration Bargaining Set (ABS) of an arbitrary cooperative game
v : 2N → R is the set of payoﬀ vectors x ∈ Rn such that
1. ∀S ⊆ N,
 
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S). (No surplus)
2. ∀i ∈ N, ∃S, i ∈ S s.th.
 
k∈S
xk ≤ v(S). (Feasibility)
3. No player is vulnerable at x. (Partnered)
The set ABS is non-empty for arbitrary cooperative games with side-payments.39
The intuitive idea behind aspirations is that the players will select their prices
before any coalition is formed. Once a set of prices is determined, some of the feasible
coalitions will form. Rather than starting with a coalition structure and ﬁnding robust
sets of payoﬀs for deviations in that coalition structure, aspiration solution concepts
ﬁnd price vectors that are ﬁxed regardless of which coalitions end up forming.
For g the ABS contains only one aspiration ˆ x = (14.96,1.36,8.04) with generating
collection GC(ˆ x) = {(X,M),(X,G),(M,G)}. Note that ˆ x is indeed in ABS as it
satisﬁes no surplus, feasibility and no vulnerability. So suppose that the coalition of
(M,G) has formed. Given that the players have chosen to demand ˆ x in order to enter
a coalition, M cannot threaten to disrupt the coalition if not given a higher payoﬀ
since G can just form a coalition with X which gives her $8.04. This is symmetrical
for all players, all the coalitions in GC(ˆ x) are “stable” in that sense.
39This was shown by Albers and Bennett. The aspiration approach is described in Bennett 1984
and 1985.
25To ﬁx ideas let C(g) denote the set of core points, E(g) the set of eﬃcient allocations
and ABS(g) the aspiration bargaining set of g. The above discussion shows that
C(g) = ∅, E(g)  = ∅ and as shown by Albers and Bennett ABS(g)  = ∅.40
For the game g, and given the solutions of the ABS, an equilibrium outcome is a
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ψi(FT), i / ∈ S
where S is the (unique) winning coalition in GC(x) ∩ P.
The outcome (π,P) is eﬃcient if
 
i∈N πi = g(N), it is eﬃcient when
 
i∈N πi <
g(N). An equilibrium outcome deﬁnes simultaneously a coalition and a payoﬀ struc-
ture.
The discussion above showed that in this case the ABS predicts the protectionist
coalition being stable. What can be said in general? The result that follows shows
that all empty core games have at least one ineﬃcient equilibrium outcome. The
converse is also true.
Theorem A game g as deﬁned above has a non-empty core if and only if, under the
ABS, all of its equilibrium outcomes are eﬃcient. Additionally, if g has a non-empty
core, the set of equilibrium outcomes is a subset of the core.41
40Alternatively, since g has an empty core and is superadditive then E(g) ∩ C(g) = ∅.
41For the proof please see S´ anchez-Mier, op cit.
26That is, if g has an empty core then there is at least one equilibrium outcome in
which the ineﬃcient policy (P in this case) is chosen. If the core is non-empty then
the ABS will produce an eﬃcient equilibrium with payoﬀs in the core of the game.
The solution concept therefore extends the core to cases in which it is empty and
provides a uniﬁed framework of analysis.
The equilibrium outcomes of g are in Table 3.5, and as predicted contains one
ineﬃcient outcome in which player M joins G in a coalition that supports the pro-
tectionist status quo. This was indeed the case in Mexico until the mid-80’s.
TABLE 3.5
Equilibria Before Tax Reform
Coalitions Policy Chosen Payoﬀs (X,M,G)
{(X,G),(M)} Free Trade (14.96,1.16,8.04)
{(M,G),(X)} Protectionism (12.22,1.36,8.04)
Billions of Dollars of 1996
As explained above, neither of the two equilibrium outcomes is in the core. While
the equilibrium with protectionism is not eﬃcient, the one where free trade is cho-
sen is. It is likely that the particulars of the historical development of business
organizations in Mexico led to the choice of the ”protectionist” equilibrium. This in-
terpretation agrees with previous studies of business organizations in Mexico.42 The
emptiness of the core played could have a fundamental role in the failed trade reforms
of the 70’s, when the free trade interests were unable to disrupt the “protectionist”
42Flores Quiroga (1998), Schneider (2002) and Thacker (2000).
27coalition.
3.4 After Tax Reform
With the new endowments, what equilibrium outcomes are predicted? First the new
game g′ is displayed in Table 3.6.
TABLE 3.6
Game After Tax Reform
g′(X) = 12.22 g′(X,M) = 16.32
g′(M) = 1.16 g′(X,G) = 24.32
g′(G) = 9.16 g′(M,G) = 10.32 g′(X,M,G) = 25.48
Billions of Dollars of 1996
The game g′ has a non-empty core. In fact, it has only one core allocation. The
ABS picks it as the unique equilibrium outcome in Table 3.7.
TABLE 3.7
Equilibria After Tax Reform
Coalition Policy Chosen Payoﬀs (X,M,G)
{(X,M,G)} Free Trade (15.16,1.16,9.16)
Billions of Dollars of 1996
In the game g′ the protectionist ﬁrms are unable to form a coalition with the
government that cannot be disrupted, the “grand coalition” forms. The increased
endowment for the government after the tax reform gives it a higher stake in the
28choice between P and FT. In the equilibrium of g′ no side payments are made and
all the players receive their endowments under free trade as their payoﬀ. The model
therefore accurately predicts the qualitative change in trade policy. In fact, for games
with non-empty cores, the ABS is always a subset of the core.43
Naturally, some assumptions were made in the calculation of parameters that can
be contested. The results of the model depend on the way that the endowments
are calculated. I believe this “non-robustness” shows that small changes in interest
groups’ endowments can produce major qualitative changes in policy.
4 Concluding Remarks
A cooperative model of policy choice and coalition formation, parameters matched
to the data, correctly predicts the trade policy changes that took place in Mexico.
The change in tax policy leads to diﬀerent endowments for the government and an
induced non-empty core game.
The degree to which the government internalizes the beneﬁts and costs of its
policy choices is directly linked to the aggregate eﬃciency of them. In this case,
the tax reform strengthens the link between government revenue and the size of the
economy. The government has a bigger stake in economic eﬃciency.
The results do not depend on assumptions of transaction costs or coalition struc-
ture. Eﬃciency does not impede the use of the cooperative approach when there
43See S´ anchez-Mier, op cit.
29is endogenous coalition formation. Something must be said about the choice of a
cooperative framework. While non-cooperative models of multilateral bargaining are
available, small changes in the speciﬁcation of player’s strategies and beliefs result
in radically diﬀerent outcomes. This raises the question of what speciﬁcation is the
right one. The cooperative approach avoids this problem and allows negotiation to
be modeled in a concise tractable model.
To the best of my knowledge, this approach is new. The theory reveals alternative
avenues of research in economic development and may prove useful in studying similar
instances of policy choice.
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